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On 24 August 1883 Henri Dieudonne de Bourbon, the comte de Chambord and
Legitimist Pretender to the French throne, who had lived out his adult life in
exile, breathed his last in the Austrian chateau of Frohsdorf. With his death the
French Bourbon line came to an end. Legitimism, it seemed, had run its course:
the hopes of a restoration, so dramatically revived in the wake of Sedan, had
come to nothing and with Chambord's death the Bourbon line itself was
extinguished. The prospects facing Legitimists were bleak. The strict logic of
succession pointed to the comte de Paris, unpalatable due to the suspect
political ideals and the perceived treachery of the Orieanists in general, and the
heritage of the comte de Paris in particular, namely the regicide Philippe-Egalite
and the usurper Louis-Philippe 'king of the barricades'. The only alternative
was to look further afield to Don Carlos, and the Spanish Bourbons, the fantasy
of the 'blancs d'Espagne', unless the disillusioned Legitimist converted to the
quixotic and bizarre movement of Naundorffism. This tendency held that the
Dauphin, Louis XVII, had escaped execution and lived as the comte de
Naundorff, Louis XVm and his brother Charles X having reigned illegitimately
As a result many chose to withdraw from political life altogether and, in the
words of Steven Kale, Legitimism entered its 'death throes'.1 With Chambord
gone there was nothing left to hold the Legitimist movement together.
It is understandable that the death of the last of the Bourbons should have
received little scrutiny. First, in the context of the fall of the Moral Order
regime and the stabilization of the Republic, there is little in the fortunes of
Legitimism in general after the collapse of the restoration efforts of 1871-3 to
detain most historians. Legitimism has no place in the meta-narrative of the
enracinetnent of the Republic. Secondly, it is not an event whose
interpretation appears problematic: Chambord's death drew a line under
Legitimism. However, I would suggest that this very simplicity is deceptive. In
the first place the dilemmas over continuing action that faced the loyal
Legitimist in 1883 were in no sense unexpected. It had been apparent for many
* The author is a temporary lecturer at the University of Manchester He wishes to thank
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MARTIN SIMPSON 379
years that Chambord was destined to die childless. At a meeting of the comites
legitimates of the south-west held in Toulouse in 1879, the representative for
the Tarn reported that when he spoke of the benefits that 'Henri V alone could
deliver, peasants would pointedly ask 'Mais apres Jui?'2 Although Joseph du
Bourg, Chambord's personal representative for the entire region of the south-
west, approved the answer 'La Maison de la France' as excellent, it was
abundantly clear that Legitimism was in this sense a doomed movement.
'L'enfant du miracle' had only postponed the extinction of the Bourbons that
the due de Berry's assassin had intended. Legitimists could not escape the fact
that they would soon find themselves bereft of a Pretender.
It is crucial to understand that Legitimism itself was far from simple, but a
diverse, complex and even divided movement. Legitimism was not focused on
the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy to the exclusion of all other
considerations. Stephane Rials has suggested that Legitimism was perhaps not
so much a political phenomenon as a social phenomenon, connected to a set of
social ideals that did not neatly translate into any single political agenda.3 For
many Legitimists, as Steven Kale has convincingly argued, a Bourbon
restoration was conceived in social terms.4 Legitimist faith did not necessarily
mean political activism. Certainly when looking for Legitimist notables, the
political organizations of the comites legitimistes are not the best starting-
point; the politically involved were invariably also members of the numerous
Legitimist-dominated literary, agricultural, charitable and religious associations,
where those Legitimist dignitaries who were not actively involved in politics
were to be found. Indeed, the importance of ultramontane Catholicism to
many Legitimists ('Catholiques avec le Pape, Royalistes avec le Roi' as the
newspaper of Legitimism in the department of the Aveyron, Le Peuple, put it)
has led to suggestions that for some Legitimists the focus was as much on Pius
EX as Chambord; increasingly the restoration of the temporal power of the
Papacy and the restoration of the monarchy were linked together.5 This leads
to questions over the role of Chambord within the Legitimist movement. If
Legitimism was not incarnated in the person of Chambord, then the linkage
between his death and the disappearance of the Legitimism movement
becomes more problematic. It can in fact plausibly be argued both that, rather
than dying with Chambord, Legitimism predeceased him and that it outlived
him. We can develop these conflicting arguments if we accept that, as I will
argue, Legitimism was essentially a local movement. Using research carried out
in two contrasting departments in the Midi-Pyrenees, the Haute-Garonne
1
 S[odet£ des] L[cttrcs de 1'] A[veyron] F" Ms 262 ct 265 reunis, summary report of meeting of
21 July 1879
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380 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
(whose cbef-iieu, Toulouse, was a historic centre of Legitimism)6 and the
Aveyron (strongly clerical and reactionary, a department where Legitimists
were elected to the Chamber of Deputies as late as 1889), I examine the impact
of the death of the comte de Chambord to ask questions about the nature of
Legitimism.7
There are powerful arguments for locating Legitimism in the person of
Chambord, of which the most obvious is by no means the strongest. Whilst
Legitimism's political project was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, it
might be argued that it was often impossible to follow this project with a great
deal of conviction. The Second Empire's apparent durability sapped Legitimist
convictions, as testified to by numerous defections, whilst those who kept the
faith were divided over political engagement or abstention as counselled by
their Pretender. When the operation of divine Providence (a force that loomed
large in Legitimist thinking) in the shape of the Prussian army felled the Second
Empire, Legitimists ultimately proved incapable of capitalizing upon the
exceptional conjuncture of an exhausted France and a monarchical National
Assembly. Although the loyal often chose to blame Orleanist intrigues for this
debacle, it subsequently required a strong faith and an incomprehension of the
political realities of France to match that of Chambord to believe that
restoration remained a credible option. Yet Legitimists were united about the
figure of Chambord not solely through their support for him as Pretender, but
also in their faith in his person. A denning trait of Legitimism was an ardent
personal attachment to Chambord, a sensibility Stephane Rials identified as
'Chambordisme'.8
This reverence for Chambord as a quasi-divine personage is perhaps best
expressed by Comely, editor of the Legitimist newspaper Clarion, in his
account of visiting Frohsdorf, where Chambord held court as Henri V. After
recounting his journey to Frohsdorf and meetings with members of
Chambord's entourage, Comely came to the moment of meeting Chambord
himself. He found him 'le francais le plus patriote, le plus moderne, le plus
eclaire, le plus Frangais qui se puisse rever. Et en meme temps un diplomate,
un soldat, pour tout dire en un mot, un Roi et un grand Roi.' Yet this language,
designed to present Chambord as a kingly figure, a true patriot, despite his
6
 See D Higgs, UltraroyaUsm in Toulouse (Baltimore, Md, 1973) Toulouse was at the heart of
the entire Legitimist movement in the south-west
7
 The choice of departments was motivated by a desire to examine the 'Midi blanc' The Hautc-
Garonne was a moderately conservative department (despite the radical orientation of Toulouse)
and demands consideration as the regional centre of Legitimism, whereas the Aveyron was
identified as an area of enduring reactionary strength and noted for its high levels of religious
practice, the epitome of the traditional rural France with which the Legitimist movement is
identified.
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MARTIN SIMPSON 381
exile, and no anachronism, but a potential enlightened modern monarch, gave
way to an entirely different tone. Comely continued:9
Ici on me permettra de deposer le crayon du reporteur et de ne pas
traduire... la conversation qui a dure plus d'une heure. Monseigneur
ne parlait au journaliste, mais au fidele, et il me semblerait que je
commets une sorte de profanation si j'imprimais ses epanchements
du souverain et mes expansions du royaliste.
Intransigent aveyronnais Legitimist Eugene de Barrau (whose inheritance
included a carefully preserved piece of paper received by Henri de Barrau in
1838 with Chambord's seal and the simple words 'A Monsieur de Barrau,
Henri') was also suitably overcome on meeting Chambord, feeling tears come
to his eyes 'devant la majeste des souvenirs vivaces dans l'heritier de tant de
rois . . ." Yet for a 'pointu' [intransigent Legitimists were known as 'purs' or
'pointus'] like de Barrau, worship of Chambord was unconditional, and
Chambord's personal qualities were ultimately immaterial. His hereditary right
was 'ce gage unique de repos et stabilite . . . Gage qui suffirait a lui seul pour
suppleer a l'absence de toutes les qualites personnelles dont le prince est si
richement dote.'10
In this context the death of Chambord could be nothing less than a tragedy;
for fervent Legitimists Chambord was the only hope for France. When in July
1883 Joseph du Bourg acknowledged that Chambord's doctors considered his
illness incurable, advocating prayer for the Virgin's miraculous intercession, he
wrote: 'Lui seul dans le monde avait prononce le mot de guerre contre la
Revolution. Lui seul pouvait la vaincre et la maitriser.'11 Consequently news of
Chambord's illness led to a spectacular display of religious fervour the comite
royaliste de Toulouse declared the necessity of 'une penitence nationale' and
special novena were organized.12 Despite this frenzied piety the ineluctable
designs of Providence were to take away the last of the Bourbons on 24 August.
Legitimists in France who had been united in prayers for his recovery ironically
learned this shattering news on 25 August, the Saint-Louis, a day that had been
heralded as holding out fresh hopes in its symbolic associations. In a letter to
Eugene de Barrau, Joseph du Bourg's brother Antoine sombrely concluded:
Les desseins de Dieu sont impenetrables, mais il faut toute la force
de la foi, et tout le secours de la grace pour s'incliner sans murmure
sous la catastrophe que sa justice a inflige a notre malhereux pays.
Dans cette nuit profonde qui s'est fait autour de nous, nous voyons
' Comely in Le Clarion, cited in L'Union du Midi, 14 June 1883 L'Union du Midi was
consulted in A[rchives] D[epartetnentales de la] H[aute-] G[aronne] at BF 340
10
 SLA F" bis 262 et 265 reunls, draft of Revue Religieuse du diocese de Rodez et de Mende, 21
November 1871 article
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382 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
settlement que la France est irrevocablement condamnee a des
mines epouvantables . . .
For Antoine du Bourg this then was the ruin of France and the close of
Legitimism: 'notre action est desormais finie . .. le mandat que nous tenions de
la confiance du Roi expire avec lui'.13 The marquis de Dreux-Breze ordered the
dissolution of the comites legitimates, and Eugene de Barrau withdrew from
political life, whilst Joseph du Bourg, unswerving in his Legitimist purism,
pledged his allegiance to Don Carlos of Spain, despite his own admission that it
was politically unviable.14
For 'purs' any mention of the comte de Paris was repugnant, and de Barrau
ended his association with Frayssinous of the Journal de I'Aveyron on account
of his article 'Le Roi est mort, Vive le Roi'.15 The choice was between political
disengagement and 'le terrain absolument catholique', as advocated by de
Barrau in the Revue religieuse du diocese de Rodez et de Mende. As former
fellow member of the comite tfgitimiste de I'Aveyron de Toulza put it, only
memories were left: 'Aujourd'hui finissent et les vieilles traditions de ma famille
et les reves de ma vie. Si nous avons eu le culte de fidelite, il nous restera celui
de souvenir.'16 A similar finality was spelled out by the L'Union du Midi, the
press organ of intransigent Legitimism, published in Toulouse and read
throughout the south-west. On 26 August Georges Maisonneuve, one of the
sub-editors, wrote:17
Sait-on bien tout ce qui meurt aujourd'hui en France avec M. le
Comte de Chambord?
C'est d'abord le sentiment du respect. . .
C'est peut-etre aussi le vieil honneur chevaleresque et franc^ ais dont
11 etait la plus fiere incarnation . . .
C'est l'autorite dont il representait le principe.
C'est I'ensemble sacre des traditions cbretiennes et nationales
re'sumees en lui et qui par lui auraient refleuri sur le vieux sol
francais.
The last edition of L'Union du Midi was published on the day that saw
Chambord interred at Goritz, and a short statement from the direction
announced 'nous brisons . . . cette valiante epee de combat... et, enveloppant
ses debris dans les plis du drapeau blanc qu'elle a toujours defendu, nous les
13
 SIA F" bis 262 et 265 reunis, letter, 26 Aug. 1883.
" A[rchives] N[ationales] F7 12431
15
 SIA F" Ws 262 et 265 reunis, letter, 28 Aug. 1883 Frayssinous defended his position and
cuttingly wrote 'J'ai ecarti de la memoire du Prince toute affirmation de responsabilltc au sujet de
la situation politkjue que nous subissons; et certes, j'ai fait effort pour ne pas laisser ecnapper de ma
plume d'ameres et cruelles reflexions.'
16
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MARTIN SIMPSON 383
deposons aupres du cerceuil de notre Roi'. With Chambord departed their
hopes was now turned heaven-wards: 'En nous inclinant devant le chef de la
Maison de France, nous supplions Henri V d'interceder, du haut du Ciel, en
faveur de notre malheureux pays, afin que Dieu le preserve des catastrophes
supremes dont menace la Revolution.'18
II
Yet another persuasive line of argument places an entirely different
interpretation on Chambord's death, identifying not so much an end as a
footnote. This argument is in fact most often made implicitly rather tiian
explicitly. General histories of the period, most notably Francois Furet's
Revolutionary France 1770-1880, focus almost exclusively on the advent of
the republican Republic, conceptualized by Furet as 'the reunion of the
republican country with its tradition'.19 This 'republican destiny5 reading of the
Third Republic inevitably marginalizes Legitimism's place within the early years
of the Third Republic. Indeed, the strong implication is that the conditions
which made the abortive restoration efforts of 1871-3 possible were a bizarre
aberration. Once the ignominious failure of Legitimists to prevail on Chambord
to compromise over the tricolour has been recounted, the narrative of the
coming of republican France can proceed. The death of Chambord may receive
a passing mention a few pages later; evidently Legitimism, as a political
movement of any consequence, died well before Chambord, condemned to
extinction by his obstinacy and intransigence. The shattering republican
electoral victory of 1881, triumphantly confirming the 1877 elections that
followed the Seize Mai, the 'town-hall revolutions' of 1878 and the senatorial
elections of 1879, all make the political irrelevance of Legitimism in the grand
narrative of the stabilization of the Third Republic apparent.
Whilst Furet's somewhat 'whiggish' approach to the Third Republic can be
questioned, it is hard not to accept the overall verdict on Legitimism.
Legitimism did rapidly become marginal, fading from the political scene during
the period of 'la republique des dues' and many of the 186 Legitimist deputies
elected in 1871 chose not to stand again. Those who did were decimated in the
elections of 1876-7, leaving a mere eighteen of them. The only evidence of any
significant strength or dynamism on the right came from the revitalized
Bonapartists; in the Haute-Garonne the Bonapartist vote in both elections
exceeded 35 per cent of the total votes cast.20 However, Legitimism's dire
18
 L'Union du Midi, 3 Sept 1883.
" F Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880 (Oxford, 1992), p 537 For a good example of a
history of the Third Republic in this mould: J.-M Mayeur and M. Rebertoui, The Third Republic
from its origins to the Great War (Cambridge, 1987)
20
 AN C 3482; Robert, Bourloton and Cougny, Dictionnaire desparlementairesfrancais 1789-
1889 (1889-91). The combined votes cast for the five Bonapartist candidates, the comte
d'Ayguesvives, Niel, Lengle, Tron and Oldekop amounted to 37.5 per cent in 1876, and 35 6 per
cent in 1877.
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384 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
electoral fortunes are not the total sum of this argument; there is also the issue
of the relationship between Legitimism and the France of the late nineteenth
century. Furet sees a clear incompatibility and delivers a telling verdict:
'uprooted by the French Revolution, royalty had never retrieved its place and
its past, of which the Church, also uprooted, constantly offered it the illusion.
French monarchy in the nineteenth century had lived in the myth of its own
tradition . . '21 This view is by no means unprecedented and Furet is quick to
remind his readers that contemporaries were sceptical; early in 1871 Renan
judged that the Bourbon monarchy had become 'impossible'.22 Chambord's
actions lend weight to this idea. The events of 1871-3 suggest that it was less
Chambord's lack of an heir as his perverse and inflexible attitudes - attitudes
which, as Halevy caustically remarked, owed little to the traditions of Henri FV
for whom Paris was worth a mass - that doomed the Legitimist movement. In
this reading Chambord was a little more than a symbol of a tradition that lacked
any relevance to the political realities of the day and his death marked the final
close of an anchronistic politics whose bankruptcy and impotence had been
amply confirmed
The concept of Legitimism as anachronistic is a crucial one, posing an
intriguing question: was Legitimism impossible even with a more tractable
Pretender? Steven Kale argues that the drapeau blanc debacle, absurd as it
might seem, was in fact perfectly consistent with Chambord's position and the
principles of intransigent Legitimism overall. Chambord's pronouncement, 'La
parole est a la France, l'heure est a Dieu', made his position dear. In his vision a
restoration was to be by acclamation, free of any conditions, not by the grace of
an elected assembly, especially not an assembly elected by universal suffrage,
which most Legitimists held not to be the true expression of the nation's
opinion but, in the words of Pius IX, 'the universal lie'. Chambord's manifesto
of 1871 promised 'le controle des deux chambres' and 'le suffrage universel
honnetement pratique', but the Legitimist understanding of these concepts
kept the locus of power firmly out of the hands of the representatives of the
people. As Stephane Rials, writing in 1983, elegantly put it:23
L'attitude du Comte de Chambord, si volontiers tournee en derision
aujourd'hui, etait d'une absolue logique au regard des principes
qu'il croyait incarner. Ce qu'il rejetait dans le drapeau tricolore
c'etait la souverainete nationale, le liberalisme, le parlementarisme
et peut-etre au-dela tout un pan de la sensibilite modeme
rationaliste et anthropocentrique. Ce qu'il voulait defendre, avec
le drapeau blanc, c'etait une certaine idee de la monarchic
paternelle et chretienne, temperee par ramour et la religion plus
que par tel ou tel mecanisme constitutionnel abstrait.
21
 Furet, Revolutionary France, p 510
a
 Ibid p 508.
23
 Rials, Le ligUimisme, p. 86
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MARTIN SIMPSON 385
Thus the reading of Chambord's death as footnote identifies the politically
fossilized agenda of Chambord - and many of his followers - as what made
Legitimism unworkable. This is supported by the defence of Chambord's actions
offered in the final editions of L 'Union du Midi, blaming France for having proved
itself unworthy of Chambord, with the result that Theure de Dieu est venue, non
pas dans la splendeur de ses promesses, mais dans toute la rigueur de ses
chatiments'.24 The restoration as offered in 1873 would have represented a
betrayal of Legitimism, argued Miles on 30 August. If he had accepted:25
On l'eut bafoue pour ses complaisances. Au lieu d'etre une haute et
vieille idee gardant absolument le droit de mepriser les fails, le
Comte de Chambord n'eut ete qu'un ambitieux vulgaire, pliant ses
allures et conformant ses paroles aux fantaisies, tneme injur-
ieuses de ses electeurs. Son non possumus fut eclaire et magnamine.
The idea that Legitimism did despise - or at the very least fundamentally
misunderstand - the political realities of late nineteenth-century France is
advanced by Robert Locke in his perceptive study of the Legitimist deputies of
1871-6. Locke argued that the classic view of Legitimists as backward and anti-
modern in their attitudes towards industrialization and capitalist exploitation
was mistaken, as much on the grounds that there is no intrinsic link between
liberalism and successful industrialization, as on the evidence of Legitimist
entrepreneurs such as Benoist d'Azy. The failure and archaism of Legitimism lay
rather in their conception of 'moral order' that neglected to accommodate the
great fact of the Revolution, and was hence inoperable in the liberal-democratic
society that the Revolution had bequeathed to nineteenth-century France.26
The clear-sighted Herve of Le Soleil had written:27
La monarchic ne sera pas, ou elle sera constitutionnelle.
La monarchic ne sera pas, ou elle sera moderne.
La monarchic ne sera pas, ou elle sera populaire.
Legitimism, as represented by Chambord, did not even aspire to the first
requirement and, despite all efforts to argue the contrary, did not fulfil the
second as understood in the France of the Third Republic. In the light of this it
is scarcely surprising that the third requirement also eluded the Legitimists.
I l l
The attitude of the intransigents of the comiti Idgitimiste de VAveyron and the
pronouncements of L'Union du Midi point to 24 August 1883 as the end of
" L'Union du Midi, 2 Sept 1883
n
 L'Union du Midi, 30 Aug. 1883 (author's Italics)
26
 R. Locke, French Legitimists and the politics of moral order in the early Third Republic
(Princeton, NJ , 1974)
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386 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
Legitimism, a view endorsed by Stephane Rials; standard accounts of the Third
Republic implicitly take 1873; and even Steven Kale, who has recently taken it
upon himself to resuscitate Legitimism, concedes that it was 'a right that did
not continue'. Whatever echoes of Legitimism persisted - and some would
find a Legitimist stamp to the organicist conceptions of Vichy - Kale analyses
the Legitimist movement as progressively splintering after the failure of the
restoration efforts, before disintegrating altogether with the loss of Chambord.
However, it is possible to argue the reverse, suggesting that although 1883 may
have required a certain readjustment, it was in no way the end. In fact, for
those moderates who had wanted Chambord to abdicate in favour of the comte
de Paris, a man whose very heritage was the tricolour (as restored by Louis-
Philippe), 1883 might even signal a new beginning. Certainly the dissolution of
the comites legitimates was far from permanent, as the 1884 Schnerb report
makes evident. This report, an extensive analysis of the state of the royalist
party, found that the vast majority of monarchist newspapers - 130 out of
143 - recognized the comte de Paris as legitimate Pretender to the throne and
that the eclipse of the comites ligitimistes had been temporary. Despite Dreux-
Breze's decree, in some departments the comites legitimistes simply continued
to function, transferring their allegiance to 'Philippe VII', whilst elsewhere the
comites royalistes that emerged included former members of the comites
legitimistes.28 In only thirteen departments was there was no activity to report
and only thirteen departments saw Legitimists dissent from this general
acceptance of the comte de Paris.29 Moreover the new structures of the parti
royaliste, which included the innovation of missi dominici to liaise with the
provincial comites and used the networks of the cercles catboliques and
syndicate agricoles, were far more sophisticated than those that had existed
under Chambord.30
Thus the Haute-Garonne comite had reformed under the leadership of
Comte Victor d'Adhemar, former member of the comite legitimiste and
Georges Maisonneuve, former sub-editor of L'Union du Midi revived the
newspaper as L'Union du Languedoc. In fact Maisonneuve even published an
open letter to Schnerb declaring 'Ce parti reconnait pour chef M. le Comte de
Paris et se propose pour but le renversement prochain de la Republique.'31
Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectations, even among the ranks of the
28
 A N F 7 12431
29
 For a more detailed breakdown of the Schneib questionnaire S Osgood, French royalism
since 1870 (The Hague, 1970)
K
 AN F7 12477, report of directeur de la Surety gtnerale, 26 Sept. 1887 Also W. Irvine
'Royalists, mass politics and the Boulanger affair1, Fr Hist, 3 (1989), for a discussion of royalist
organization under the comte de Paris
31
 AN F7 12431, L'Union du Languedoc, 7 Mar 1883 Les NouveUes, another Legitimist
publication that had switched its support to the comte de Paris, was more circumspect; some held
that taking the provocative line of Maisonneuve was to risk prosecution on the charge of
attempting to foment unrest. However, comment on the Scherb questionnaire was common and
the material in AN includes dippings from many monarchist publications mocking the directeur of
the Suret6gin6rale, responding with their own reports about the state of the local royalist Jjarty or
expressing their contempt for the method of turning the prifets into 'mouchards'
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MARTIN SIMPSON 387
'chevau-legers' (as the intransigent Legitimist deputies of 1871-6 were known)
examples of leading Legitimists who were ready to sponsor the comte de Paris
are not hard to find. Gabriel de Belcastel, former senator for the Haute-
Garonne, and the distinguished Albert de Mun, who famously proclaimed
'Nous sommes la Contre-Revolution irreconciliable', were swift to rally publicly
to the comte de Paris, in both cases motivated by the wish to prevent divisions
over this issue. In the Correze, the baron de Laprade, former local
representative of Chambord, declared, 'moi intransigent blanc qui n'a jamais
faibli, je me range au parti du roi des barricades. Les enfants ne sauraient pas
etre responsables des fautes de leur pere - a tout peche, misericorde!'32 If
Legitimist political success at a national level was, to say the least, elusive after
the Seize Mai, it did not necessarily indicate the cessation of Legitimist political
activity. Indeed, the Aveyron may have lacked the structure of a cotnite
royaliste, but it did not lack royalist candidates: Legitimists de Montety and de
Benoit successfully stood in 1885 and 1889, whilst on a local level Victor de
Bonald and Henri de Valady, former Legitimist deputies, continued to win re-
election as conseillers g6n6raux.
The issue of political activism, however, is far from simple. There are
obvious objections to the argument that continuing political activity on the
part of local Legitimists proves the persistence of Legitimism. First there is the
difficult question of whether those who did choose to continue to contest
elections - unsuccessfully in the Haute-Garonne, successfully in the Aveyr-
on - did so as Legitimists. Did adopting the compromise stance of I'union
conservatrice, setting aside the whole issue of monarchy to focus upon 'la
defense sociale et religieuse', signal a betrayal of Legitimist principles? Secondly
there are questions about the nature of Legitimism. It might be argued that
what was crucial was not so much the national level as the local level. The
social ideals of Legitimism were those of decentralism and Christian
paternalism, chiefly concerned not with the national dimension but the local
dimension.33 The key concern was how social relations functioned at the local
level, with an idealization of the anden regime of counter-revolutionary
imagining that saw close relations of deference and responsibility that tied a
local nobility/notability to their social inferiors. The ideal of the local seigneur
providing protection and aid for his suitably deferential tenants, an ideal
nourished by Legitimist works of history and romantic fiction, was one that
exercised a powerful hold over the Legitimist imagination. Andre-Jean Tudesq
argued that the Legitimist ideology, 'une conception morale et non sociale de la
societe', was rooted in a mythologized past, the anden regime 'reconstruit
ideologiquement' .M
32
 A N F7 1 2 4 3 1 .
33
 See S Hazareeslngh, From subject to citizen (Princeton, NJ , 1998), for a clear explanation of
the place of the local dimension and decentralization within the Legitimist ideology
34
 A.-J Tudesq, Les grands notables en France, 1840-49 (2 vols , Bordeaux, 1964), 1. 211.
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388 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
Tudesq's work also proved that the scale of the 'emigration a l'interieur' in
the wake of the 1830 revolution had been much exaggerated; despite the
claims of Rene Remond it appears that Legitimists did not retire en masse,
continuing to play a significant local role.35 Legitimism was thus in many ways
a local phenomenon and it is on the local level that we should look for
continuing Legitimist influence and action. Indeed, focusing on the local level
allows an interpretation of the result of 1871 as not a bizarre by-product of
extraordinary political convulsions, but as a perfectiy logical expression of a
solid local power that had been assiduously built up from the 'emigration a
rinterieur' onwards. Steven Kale makes precisely this case, noting that of 957
non-Bonapartist conseillers generaux in 1870, 415 were Legitimists, making
them the largest political tendency represented.56
The issue of whether the focus of Legitimism should be local or national was
a crucial one during the Second Empire. The local level was in many ways
preferable. First, Legitimists were vested with a considerable local strength that
they had successfully conserved through the July Monarchy and the Second
Republic. Secondly, and more importantly, although strength in the conseti
general was a good Indicator of this enduring local power, local influence did
not require political involvement. Roles as maires or conseillers generaux
denoted local influence rather than conferred it. Legitimists had traditional
means of local influence, often related to their standing as grandsproprietaires
and their prominent role in paternalist charitable and religious associations
such as the Conferences de Saint-Vincent de Paul. In the context of the national
dominance of Bonapartism, and the comte de Chambord's instruction for
Legitimists to abstain from political engagement, such social activism was
hailed as the answer by the comte de Falloux:37
It is not enough to formulate decrees on the past and prognosti-
cations on the future; we have to moralize villages and towns to
combat revolutionary influences and to found and develop religious
institutions. The field still remains an immense one. All the strength
of the old royalist party and all which it is famous for may be
displayed in this, with great honour and great profit to France.
Fulfilling die role of a responsible local notabilty did not merely conserve intact
the traditional Legitimist clientele, but was also crucial to dieir self-identity. In
areas where Legitimists could plausibly claim to provide an unchallenged local
leadership that was looked to for guidance and protection, ideology and reality
intersected, assuring Legitimists that the essence of France was Catholic,
monarchical and hierarchical. In pursuing diis local agenda Legitimists were, in
die analysis of Steven Kale, following their key goal, the rechristianization of
French society.
35
 R. Remond, Histoire des Droites en France (4th cdn, 1982) Remond refers to the period
1830-71 as 'quarante ans d'abstention' for the Legitimists.
36
 Kale, Legitimism.
37
 De Falloux, Memoirs of a royalist, trans. Pitman (2 vols., 1888), ii 156
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MARTIN SIMPSON 389
Political involvement on the national stage offered no such attractions. There
were rather several dangers: first, the tactic of working within Bonapartism
could lead to defections - in the Haute-Garonne, for example, the comte
d'Ayguesvives, made an Gcuyer de I'imp&ratrice, was permanently converted
to the imperial cause38 - and secondly, working against Bonapartism often
required compromising coalitions.39 Indeed the politics of the Union Iiberale
ultimately •went beyond compromising coalition politics; in trying to widen the
appeal of Legitimism by pressing for liberal reforms in concert with Orleanists
and republicans, liberal Legitimists took a political stance directly at odds with
the principles of their Pretender. Neither Chambord nor the intransigent
Legitimist majority could countenance parliamentary sovereignty and universal
suffrage; as Remond observed, the most accurate statement of their political
principles came in 1864 •with Pius IX's programmatic rejection of the
nineteenth century, the Syllabus of Errors.40 Tellingly Legitimist deputies
were to organize an address in 1871 congratulating Pius LX on the 'grand et
courageux Syllabus qui garde toute la verite sociale'.
It was on precisely such an agenda that the most significant Legitimist
political mobilization of the 1860s was to occur. The Legitimist opposition that
emerged in the late 1860s was concerned not with the liberal and decentralist
agenda of the Union Iiberale, but the temporal rights of the Papacy and
Catholic liberties. Ultimately Legitimism under the Second Empire was not
merely at odds over the question of political engagement, or the local versus
the national, but ideologically divided. A liberal minority was willing to pursue
a liberal agenda of compromise that could stretch to include Orieanist ideas of
a constitutional parliamentary monarchy, ranged against whom were those to
whom the notion of such a compromise signified a negation of all the
principles incarnated in the legitimate monarchy. The liberalism of de Falloux,
who believed that Legitimists had to find a way to accommodate the fact of the
Revolution,41 was anathema to the ultramontane intransigents. The abbe Morel,
contrasting de Mun and de Falloux, attacked the latter as 'un homme d'entre-
deux . . . un homme d'un croisement qui n'a pas encore existe; un metis de la
Revolution et la Contre-Revolution'.42 As Hazareesingh argues, modern
58
 ADHG 3M 222
39
 On the issue of Legimist politics under the Second Empire S Kale, 'French Legitimists and the
politics of abstention, 1830-1870', Fr Hist Stud, 20 (1997), 665-701
40
 'L'idee de restauiation n'en est pas moins la note dominance du systimc de pensce legitlmiste
. le systeme se formule en un mot . contre-rcvolution e'est peut-etre un document de
caractere religieux, le texte du Syllabus aux anathemes duquel Us souscrivent volontiers, qui
presente le meilleur exposi de leur pensec ' Remond, Histoire des Drottes, p 128
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 De Falloux wrote to Dupanloup in 1872. 'SI on rejette tout, le bien comme le mal, depuls 80
ans, on se place en dehors de la Restauration et Ton va blen autrement loin que le comte de Maistre
. on ne peut la [la Revolution] supprimer ni du passe, nl du present, ni de l'avenir Ne pas
savoir cela ou l'oublier, e'est se placer en dehors des notions les plus elementaires de la politlque et
du bon sens ' J Gadille, La pensce et I'action poUttque des 6veques frartfais au dibut de la III
RipubUque 1870/1883 (2 vols, 1967), L 85.
42
 J. Morel, M. de Mun etM.de Falloux (1879), p 8
 at B
olland Library, U
W
E Bristol on June 13, 2013
http://fh.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
390 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
Legitimist discourses were constantly subverted by an older discourse of
subjects, subordination and hierarchy.43
IV
Examining Legitimist political activity in the Second Empire makes it dear that
it is possible to construct three plausible alternative arguments about the
relationship between the demise of Chambord and the demise of the Legitimist
movement because Legitimism was a divided and contradictory movement. As
a movement whose ideology did not translate into any simple brand of politics,
and as a movement which lacked any effective political direction (the Second
Empire had witnessed a widespread repudiation of Chambord's directives on
abstention), Legitimism was incapable of agreeing on a single political strategy.
The experience of the Second Empire revealed that Legitimism was pulled in
diametrically opposite directions, between a backward-looking and traditional
politics, conceptualized by its champions as a politics of Legitimist purity, and
between a moderate liberal forward-looking politics of compromise, ready to
adapt to the changing nature of politics.44
The issue of the politics of compromise versus the politics of Legitimist
purity is illuminated by examining the action of the comites legimitistes. The
evidence of the correspondence of Eugene de Barrau, head of the comite
legitimiste de I'Aveyron, provides a very detailed image of a comite legitimiste
in an overwhelmingly clerical and reactionary department, which continued to
elect Legitimists until 1889- De Barrau was in regular contact with Joseph du
Bourg (Chambord's representative for the entire south-west region) and his
brother Antoine du Bourg, and his correspondence has the strength of allowing
us to identify general strategic considerations beyond local concerns. The first
point that emerges is that the comite legitimiste was determined that
Legitimists should be a powerful force in local politics, contesting all elections.
Circulars on the need for organization and the need to ready themselves for
forthcoming elections, from municipal to senatorial, decisively indicate that the
Legitimists were determined to engage politically. However, successive
elections cruelly exposed the limits of their influence and the power of the
comiti. The central issue was that of conservative union. De Barrau's decision
to stand as a lone independent in 1871 made his position clear, whilst the
experiences of 1871-3 left men such as Joseph du Bourg equally convinced
that alliances with the Orleanist centre-right were fatal. In the context of the
Seize Mai du Bourg warned:45
C'est pour nous un devoir de rappeler que M. de Broglie est celui
dont 1'action perfide mais cachee a ferme en 1873 la porte de la
43
 Hazareesingh, From subject to citizen
** Hazareesingh persuasively argues that the Second Empire must be seen as a turning-point in 'the
culture of polities', an era during which the practice of universal suffrage in France became normalized.
45
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MARTIN SIMPSON 391
France au roi, qu'il est le chef de ce centre-droite ou se perpetue la
tradition de 1830, tradition de revolution, d'intrigues, d'ambitions
egoistes et de haines contre la legitimite.
Conservatism was at best deeply suspect, and at worst actively worked to the
ruin of Legitimist hopes. A note of 1876 therefore fulminated against
Telasticite du mot "conservateur," la mystification qu'il recouvre' that had
facilitated the election of Mayran and Delsol, representatives of 'la revolution
Orleano-Bonapartiste' ,46
Yet the evident impossibility of finding Legitimist candidates with a realistic
chance of success in every drconscription complicated matters. On the one
hand, not putting up candidates seemed an admission of weakness, whilst on
the other incidents such as the risible showing of the vicomte d'Armagnac in
1876 (standing against the Bonapartist Azemar in the first Rodez drconscrip-
tion he received 419 votes - 39 per cent) only served to discredit them. These
were recognized problems; an 1877 circular from the bureau des deputes
royalistes required information on royalist candidates who might succeed with
administrative support, conservative candidatures which threatened royalist
interests, and the possibility of finding non-threatening conservative candidates
to oppose them.47 It was, however, not merely a case of non-threatening
conservatives; ironically the few successful Legitimists were deemed suspect.
In 1877 the cotnite dipattementcd approached Antoine du Bourg, brother of
the influential Joseph du Bourg, close friend of Eugene de Barrau and regular
visitor to the Avcyron, asking him to stand against the Millau sortant de Bonald.
Du Bourg excused himself, on the grounds that he was not widely known,
whilst de Bonald was not only well established but also assured of the
administration's support; de Bonald's candidature was therefore grudgingly
accepted as 'inevitable et peu satisfaisante' despite the engagements he had
taken before the Millau branch.48 Although he had not been prepared to stand
against de Bonald, Antoine du Bourg evidently shared the comite's reservations
and in the electoral manoeuvrings of 1880 he wrote to de Barrau: 'II y aurait de
plus, aupres de gens comme Valady et de Bonald, qui se plaignent que le parti
est rnort dans l'Aveyron, avantage a leur falre sentir qu'ils se trompent et leur
faire ctomprendre qu'ils ne peuvent rien contre nous, ou sans nous.'49
The story of the fortunes of aveyronnais Legitimism, as read through the
correspondence of Eugene de Barrau, reveals the fundamental inability of the
comiti legitimiste to find candidates whose Legitimist credentials were
satisfactory, or to construct alliances with other reactionaries on acceptable
terms. Increasingly the suggestions put forward smacked of a dangerous level
46
 Ibid., note s.d.
•" Ibid, 9 June 1877, circular. However, Joseph du Bourg and de Barrau were both wary of this
Comiti de la Droite, which confirmed their worst suspicions by sponsoring the liberal Pradle\
•" SLA F" bis 528, 20 July 1877 and 8 Aug. 1877, letters. Any sign of moderation was suspect;
Antoine du Bourg expressed himself 'peniblement surpris' to find that Boisse had not voted with
other deputies of the extreme Right in May 1874.
* Ibid . 23 Mar. 1880, letter.
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392 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
of self-deception, if not outright delusion. For instance, in 1879 Antoine du
Bourg suggested an electoral alliance with Barascud in Saint-Affrique, provided
Barascud would accept their direction. As Barascud enjoyed an entrenched
position of considerable strength and held Orleanist attitudes which du Bourg
viewed with deep distaste, there was little evidence to believe that he would
find this an attractive prospect Again and again it was asserted that if they took
the lead, Legitimists could construct alliances on 'le terrain religieux et social'
with a minimum requirement of a readiness to support a restoration, should
the eventuality occur. In 1881 du Bourg insisted, 'nous sommes en situation de
la faire, car si nous ne sommes pas assez forts pour triompher tous seuls, nous
le sommes assez pour faire echouer d'autres listes conservatrices'.50 There was,
however, remarkably little evidence to support this assertion. In fact it seems
that there was no possibility of putting up Legitimist candidates to sabotage
untrustworthy conservatives. The issue was rather that of putting up Legitimist
candidates to prove that Legitimism was still a credible political movement.
After unsuccessful efforts to persuade local Legitimist notables de Toulza or de
Castelnau to stand in Saint-Affrique, Antoine du Bourg found himself
wondering whether it was worth posing abbe Vernhet's candidature, 'assuree
d'un insucces complet'. Commenting on de Montety's refusal to stand in Millau
in 1881 du Bourg gloomily observed:51
Je crois que partout vous serez reduits a assister en spectateur a la
lutte et que vous serez contraints observer l'abstention. Evidem-
ment c'est facheux, parce que la cause de cette attitude ne
trompera personne et que dans nos campagnes nos populations
catholiques seront obligees de se jeter vers le bonapartisme qui seul
engagera la lutte contre la Republique.
A circular of March 1881 confirmed that the situation in Aveyron was by no
means unique: the comte de Chambord's preference for abstention rather than
involvement in the unsavoury politics of the Union Conservatrice as practised
in 1876-7 was made clear. It •was earnestly claimed that 'l'abstention motivee
et expliquee ne voulant pas dire l'inertie, faiblesse ou decouragement, mais
signifiant protestation contre les mensonges du suffrage universel, signinant
resolution de hitter contre la revolution, signifiant surtout discipline'.52 These
claims could not disguise the fact that abstention - especially as not
appreciably observed by any substantial proportion of the electorate - could
hardly fail to be read as an admission of political impotence. It was in fact a
classically Chambordist position, a retreat to the dry rock of principle whence
intransigent Legitimists were never to return: 'Ce n'est pas vers un succes
50
 Ibid , 29 May 1881, letter.
" Ibid, 21 July 1881, letter
" SLA F" bis 262 et 265 reuais, note of March 1881 It was stated that where abstention could
not be assured owing to the desire of royalist partisans to take part in elections or owing to the risk
of being misinterpreted, it was strictly forbidden to support anything other than 'candidatures
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MARTIN SIMPSON 393
electoral que nous devons tendre, mais c'est un acte de vie que nous devons
faire, c'est une affirmation que nous devons produire, ne nous preoccupant
que de la valeur du principe que nous mettons en avant.'53
If the comites legitimates, then, were concerned with creating a strong
political movement, the conclusion must be not only that they failed to do so,
but that despite their hopes and schemes, during the period from the Seize Mai
to the death of Chambord they were in no sense effective. Du Bourg cautioned
that placing themselves on exclusively monarchical terrain risked seeing the
anti-republican struggles take place outside their orbit, but the truth was worse
still - even what actual Legitimist electoral activity occurred mostly took place
outside their orbit. The most well-known and successful Legitimist candidates,
Henri de Valady and Victor de Bonald, were conspicuously men they did not
trust, men who, in contrast to de Barrau, had engaged in the Union
Conservatrice, standing as candidates of MacMahon in 1877. But I would
suggest that this state of affairs was not untypical, looking at the evidence
yielded by some of the correspondence of the great Toulousain cbevau-leger
and senator, Gabriel de Belcastel. The letters of comte Victor d'Adhemar
(future representative of the comte de Paris for the south-west region) to de
Belcastel give us the other side of the picture. Whereas de Barrau was in
accordance with du Bourg and the men of LUnion du Midi in his belief in an
uncompromising stance, d'Adhemar was more of a political realist. Thus in
1877 he was apprehensive over the issue of obtaining official support, appalled
at the prospect of Brettes-Thurin opposing the entrenched Bonapartist Charies
Niel and feared - correctly as it turned out - that Legitimist chances were slim:
'nous serons done tres maigres et tres pauvres. Au fond il n'y a que Villefranche
oil nous ayons quelque chance . . . II y aura la M. Lamothe et M. Lamothe pour
representer a lui seul tout le parti legitimiste au departement est fort
humiliant.'54
It became increasingly apparent to d'Adhemar that his fellow Legitimists
were politically blind. When the Echo de Provence chose to attack de Broglie
during the Seize Mai with approval of Christophe du Bourg, head of the Haute-
Garonne comite legitimiste, he wrote exasperatedly:55
Nos amis sont absolument insenses . . . Les raisons ne sont rien pour
eux, les faits encore moins. La fantasmagorie, les grands mots creux,
les phrases toutes faites, voila ce qui leur plait. . . Ils ne croient pas
qu'il faille absolument former l'union conservatrice, ils se soucient a
peine de la Prefecture et de ses influences, ils prendraient pour
candidat n'importe qui au hasard du tirage a sort.. . On fait detester
le Roi en s'isolant ainsi dans les instants perilleux et en ne sachant
pas reconnaitre le part de bien et de noblesse qui se trouve dans les
hommes charges aujourd'hui . . . de sauver leur pays.
53
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394 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
D'Adhemar later despaired of the Comiti de I'Union Conservatrice, formed
by the majority of the conseti gSneral in 1878 to elect suitably conservative
candidates to the Senate. He judged it 'pire que mort' and saw Courtois de
Vicose (Bonapartist and future head of the cotnitS reacttonnaire of 1885) as
the sole member capable of taking initiative. Of the role played by the leaders
of the comite legitimiste he was scathing:56
quant a du Bourg et Maignon, Us courent au diable comme toujours
. . . Ds ne savent pas ce qu'il y a a faire [et] ils en concluent qu'il ne
faut rien faire. Si nous les poussons ils bondiront contre nous et nos
amis d'importance; ils ne connaissent personne, ne disent que de
betises et voila comment le temps passe.
Moreover, as in the Aveyron, it would appear that the comite legitimiste lacked
control of the movement in the Haute-Garonne. Certainly the overall
involvement of Gabriel de Belcastel seems to have far outweighed that of
Christophe du Bourg. Whereas the former organized meetings to discuss the
decrets (the decrees dissolving the Jesuits and other non-authorized religious
congregations) and appealed for unity in face of the threats to religious
liberties, the latter presided over Legitimist banquets and assiduously attended
the Legitimist commemorative ceremonies.57
It is hard to imagine that d'Adhemar can have mourned the departure from
politics of the du Bourgs occasioned by Chambord's death. As a man who had
complained of Timpossibilite de guerir les comites imbeciles qui nous dirigent'
the departure of the intransigents must have been in many respects a profound
relief.58 A pragmatist, who had been ready to recognize the strong argument in
favour of supporting MacMahon and de Broglie, d'Adhemar now found himself
at the head of a rejuvenated comite royaliste de la Haute-Garonne. Members
included former deputies Sacaze and Depeyre, whose Legitimist sympathies
had faltered to the point where both were considered Orleanists.59 Though
wary of a slide to the centre-right, d'Adhemar continued to be politically active
into the 1890s. However, there are serious questions to be asked about this
continuing political engagement. First, can it truly be termed 'Legitimism
without the Bourbons'? Secondly, should we see a continuity rather than a
sharp change - were men like d'Adhemar in the Haute-Garonne and de Bonald
in the Aveyron pursuing a politics that they had followed since the installation
of the Moral Order regime of MacMahon after the failures of 1871-3? At that
* Ibkl, letter s d.
57
 ADHG 4M 95-7. Du Bourg presided over the great Legitimist banquet of 9 October 1882
which gathered 1,200 guests and was attended by Godlenskl ofL'Union and Comely of le Clarion
There is only one report of an actual meeting organized by the comiti ligitimiste - a decidedly
aristocratic gathering In January 1881
* ADHG 1J 1370, letter s d.
" Although classified as Legitimists in 1871, both men subsequently deviated substantially.
Depeyre was seen as politically suspect by Joseph du Bourg, believed to have acted against
Legitimists as minister for justice under de Broglie, whilst Sacaze was elected to the Senate as a
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MARTIN SIMPSON 395
time d'Adhemar saw the absolute necessity of the Union Conservatrice and was
candid enough to analyse the failure in terms closer to those of Falloux than du
Bourg. If the assembly had been too 'parliamentary' to leave the nature of the
regime to the restored king, he wrote to de Belcastel in 1875, 'et d'un autre cote,
disons le entre nous, le Roi a eu le tort de ne jamais s'inquieter pratiquement
des elements excellents qui composaient l'assemblee. II la tenait en trop grand
dedain, et sur ce point ses journaux et ses conseillers l'ont aveugle.'60
The fundamental point is that the divisions made concrete by Chambord's
death were not only well in evidence before this point, but that they had also
hardened. The comites legitimates embodied a Legitimism that took an all-or-
nothing stance that was unworkable in both the moderately conservative
Haute-Garonne and the solidly clerical Aveyron. Despite their strenuous efforts
to construct an effective political force, the comites were ultimately embroiled
in unrealizable schemes that tended to an increasing political immobilism.
Theirs was a Legitimism of commemoration and fidelity, centred on their
celebration of their principles and their veneration of Chambord. Well before
the death of Chambord the more moderate Legitimists had, disavowing neither
their Legitimism nor their respect for Chambord and his loyal representatives,
engaged in the politics of compromise.
These political divides within Legitimism lead us first to pose difficult questions
about Legitimist political identity, and then in turn to ask further hard
questions about the very nature of Legitimism. The fundamental question must
be 'what Legitimism meant' after the death of Chambord. Only if we can
identify a distinctive Legitimist cast to Legitimist activity in the wake of
Chambord's death can we truly identify a genuine 'Legitimism without the
Bourbons'. In the case of continuing political activism this is, to say the least,
problematic. The lack of any clear consensus on Legitimist politics makes it
hard to argue conclusively whether the moderate politics of compromise
adopted well before Chambord's death can be identified as 'Legitimist polities'.
As I shall argue, we must keep in mind the concept that Legitimism was both
more and less than a political movement and ultimately looked beyond politics
to construct a satisfying argument about 'Legitimism without the Bourbons'.
Politics, however, as the basis for the simple argument that Legitimism adapted
and continued after the death of Chambord, must form the starting-point of this
enquiry.
Certainly there can be no question that d'Adhemar's pragmatic politics
indicated a conscious desertion of Legitimism. D'Adhemar associated with the
leading Legitimists of the Haute-Garonne and was scrupulous in his attendance
of the annual masses of 21 January that commemorated the execution of Louis
XVI, crucial Legitimist rituals, that affirmed a collective memory and a
60
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396 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
collective vision of the horrors of the Revolution. Recognizing the comte de
Paris as Chambord's legitimate successor no more indicated a political
conversion in his case than it did in the case of Comte Albert de Mun.
However, the issue is whether there was a distinctiveness to Legitimist politics.
If the core of Legitimist politics was 'la defense sociale et religieuse', then
perhaps we can identify d'Adhemar's politics as the politics of Legitimism.
Even in the tactical interests of the comte de Paris, he was not prepared to
support the anti-clerical Boulangist de Susini and even stood against him in an
1890 by-election. Likewise the platform on which Legitimists Jaffary, the
marquis d'Ayguesvives (brother to the turncoat comte) and Sacaze stood as
members of the list of the Union Conservatrice in 1885 laid the emphasis
squarely on the menace of revolution, the violation of the liberty
d'enseignentent and religious persecution. In the clerical Aveyron, de Montety
and de Benoit were elected as part of a liste de la droite which stressed the
material and moral ruin brought about by the Republic and emphasized their
determination to restore the catechism and religious education in schools.
Yet these examples indicate that such principles and discourse were the
common property of the right, something that made the political situation
intensely problematic for the Legitimists. They viewed themselves as the
natural defenders of Catholicism, a role that they had stressed after the shift in
Napoleon Hi's Italian policy, but under the Third Republic they were to find
that the other reactionary elements - from Orleanists and Bonapartists to
clerical anti-republicans - were equally ready to champion the rights of the
Church and the liberty d'enseignement. This was perfectly illustrated in the
Aveyron in 1886: in the context of the lot Goblet, banning all the numerous
members of the teaching orders from teaching in state schools, the reactionary
notability united in a crusade against the 'ecoles athees'. The Aveyron's three
senators and six deputies - a mixture of Orleanists, Bonapartists and
Legitimists - published a joint manifesto declaring the necessity of opening
'ecoles chretiennes' and established the Comite departemental des Ecoles
cbretiennes towards which they contributed a grand total of 57,700 francs 6l In
view of these facts, it is tempting to take up the ideas developed by Michel
Denis in his study of royalism in the Mayenne, where he argues that Legitimism
lost its distinctive character to become absorbed into the broader current of
conservative politics, a current that eventually led to an acceptance of 'le
terrain constitutionnel'.62 Indeed it is arguable that the Moral Order regime of
1873-7 was very conducive to such a politics; in a context where the
impossibility of restoring Chambord was only too apparent, those Legitimists
who were not embittered 'purs' were ready to unite with other conservatives
about the fundamental issues of religious and social defence.
Yet the choice was not simply between continuing political action in alliance
with other conservatives, leaving the dynastic issue to one side, and
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MARTIN SIMPSON 397
withdrawal into the politics of fantasy, nostalgia and commemoration.
Legitimism was never simply about politics, and analyses of Legitimism which
imply that its essence was political fundamentally misunderstand the nature
of the movement. The examples of the great Legitimists Gabriel de Belcastel
and Albert de Mun, both of whom acted as parliamentary representatives,
indicate that the most powerful expressions of Legitimism were often non-
political63 Both de Belcastel and de Mun recognized the comte de Paris as
legitimate Pretender, but their actions from well before Chambord's death
pointed to a less compromising mode of 'Legitimism without the Bourbons'.
Both argued the case for the monarchy in similar terms. De Belcastel,
speaking in 1881, declared, 'Nous qui sommes catholiques avant et par-
dessus tout, nous ne pouvons pas oublier les bienfaits de la Monarchic et les
crimes de la Revolution',64 whilst de Mun later wrote 'J'ai ete ardemment
royaliste . . . Je l'ai ete parce que ma foi politique trouvait, en celui qui la
representait, l'union parfaite de mes convictions religieuses et mes
conceptions sociales.'65
It was above all in social activism and ultramontane Catholicism that their
Legitimism expressed itself. De Belcastel was closely involved in the Sacre-
Coeur basilica and the Voeu National movement,66 organized pilgrimages to
Lourdes and, in the context of the lois Ferry, headed both the ComitS de
Defense des Interets Catboliques de la Haute-Garonne and the Oeuvre des
Ecoles Litres. In his La Monarchic cbretienne, written in the wake of
Chambord's death, de Belcastel selected their role in charity and Catholic
education as the most memorable achievements of the Legitimist movement.67
De Mun, as a figure of national stature, served on the bureau of the Comiti de
Defense religieuse de Paris and was most notable for his concern with the
social question, displayed in his paternalistic efforts to rechristianize the
working class. His Oeuvre des cercles ouvriers, one of the first charitable
movements aimed at the industrial working class, boasted a membership of
60,000 at the turn of the century, a figure that exceeded the combined total of
all the socialist movements.68 The ultramontane Catholicism that de Mun
shared with de Belcastel and other Legitimists led to his attempt to construct a
Catholic party in 1885, an effort scotched by Pope Leo XIE's determination that
Catholicism should not be represented by what was effectively a monarchist
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398 THE DEATH OF HENRI V
party, however sincere their beliefs.69 The intent was, however, strikingly
different from the adoption of the Union Conservatrice as pursued by
d'Adhemar and others. Ultimately de Mun accepted Leo XBTs exhortations and
rallied to the Republic, pursuing his social agenda within the framework of the
Republic, as witnessed by a law restricting women's night work passed in
1892. De Belcastel, however, never rallied to the Republic, dying in 1891 as the
raUiement got under way; fittingly one of his last appearances was as an orator
at the congress of the Union des Oeuvres ouvrieres held at Montauban in 1889.
As should be apparent, different visions of Legitimism and the diversity of the
Legitimist movement make it perfectly possible to argue that Legitimism both
died before Chambord did and outlasted him. Arguably as a realistic political
movement, Legitimism predeceased Chambord, The intransigent Legitimists of
the comite's had mostly subsided into abstention or political quiescence by
1883, despite the polemical vigour of the Legitimist press, whilst those who
were to stay politically involved had already largely succumbed to the
influences of the Union conservatrice. As Michel Denis persuasively argues,
this element of Legitimism was in the process of being absorbed into a broader
conservative politics that would represent a substantial body of anti-republican
opinion throughout France.70 On the other hand, Legitimism as an emotional
movement was intimately bound up with the person of Chambord. Chambord
was the embodiment of the true house of France, which Legitimists honoured
and celebrated with the commemorative rituals of the 21 January, the Saint-
Henri and the banquets held to mark Chambord's birthday. Indeed if the case
for identifying Legitimism with the comte de Chambord on the grounds that it
ostensibly stood for his elevation to the throne is fairly weak, the case for
identifying Legitimism with Chambord in terms of the fact that their collective
rituals and commemoration required him as a symbolic focus is very
convincing. Such events were not incidental to Legitimism, but absolutely
fundamental: the fullest accounts of the Legitimist notability of the Haute-
Garonne come not from records of the attendance of political meetings, but
from reports on the messes du 21 Janvier Jx Thus rather than reading the
outpourings of the polemical press, the delegations of Vendeens, the
declarations that the hour of deliverance was at hand and Chants de Jeanne
d'Arc in Chambord's last years as ridiculous or pathetic we should perhaps
attempt to understand them as symbolic offerings, celebrating the cult of
Chambord and the Bourbon line. In this sense Chambord was fundamental to
Legitimism and if, after his death, loyalty could be transferred to the comte de
Paris, this sense of quasi-religious devotion could not be. Albert de Mun later
® The ideas of a Catholic party were strong among clerlco-Legitimists. In 1889 Delpech, one of
the vicatres-g(n£raux of the Toulouse dicocese, asked de Belcastel to persuade Emile Keller to
stand as 'un candkiat purement catholique' against the anti-clerical Boulangist de Suslni ADHG 1J
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wrote: 'A dater de ce jour [the funeral of Chambord] il y eut place encore dans
mon esprit pour l'opinion monarchique: il n'y en eut plus dans mon coeur,
quel que nit mon respect pour l'heritier du droit traditionnel, pour la croyance
en la monarchic . . .>72
The possibility of an enduring 'Legitimism without the Bourbons' was
therefore to be found outside the political sphere. Legitimist ideology was
concerned with society and the nature of social relations, above all social
relations at the local level. The combination of ultramontane Catholicism,
social concern and paternalism that de Belcastel and de Mun displayed were
the social traits of Legitimism, illustrating the social ideals that Legitimists had
linked to a restored Christian monarchy. This sense of Legitimism proved able
to outlive Chambord, once it was uncoupled from the context of a restoration.
Indeed, this line of argument can be pushed a little further. If Legitimism
became focused on the social ideals, as expressed in the distinctively Legitimist
movement of social Catholicism, or through a more standard interest in local
charity, paternalism and good works, there was no essential need for
Chambord, dead or alive. From the emigration a I'int&rieur to Chambord's
death there were only really two episodes (setting aside the farcical attempt of
the duchesse de Berry to restore her son by instigating a rising of the Vendee)
when Legitimism was concerned with restoring Chambord - the Second
Republic and 1871-3. Otherwise Legitimism was concerned with the local
level and certain religious and social conceptions that perhaps had no intrinsic
need of Chambord for their realization. The step from political disengagement
and involvement in social and religious projects to an acceptance that
Legitimist social ideals could legitimately be pursued outside the structure of
the restored monarchy was not great. Paradoxically, Legitimist ideology could
adapt itself to an absence of the Bourbon line. In this sense, it was only the
narrow thread of Chambordist sensibility that connected 'Henri V to his
followers.
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